

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07

L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

SAJ-01 NIC-01 OMB-01 FEA-01 OES-03 EB-07 TRSE-00

COME-00 ACDA-05 INT-05 AID-05 CIEP-01 STR-01 CEA-01

ERDA-05 /104 W

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R 151207Z MAR 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8180

INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

CINCEUR

CINCLANT

CINCPAC

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

USNMR SHAPE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 3485

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

CINCUSAREUR FOR POLAD  
CINCUSNAVEUR FOR POLAD  
GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE  
SHAPE FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, UR, XZ  
SUBJECT: SOVIET POLICY ON SCANDINAVIA

REF: A. HELSINKI 0313  
B. COPENHAGEN 0534  
C. HELSINKI 0322  
D. OSLO 0228  
E. HELSINKI 2210, OCT 30, 1974

1. SUMMARY. WE DO NOT SHARE THE OPINION BEING VOICED IN MUCH PUBLIC SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE EMBARKING ON ANY GRAND NEW COURSE IN THEIR RELATIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SCANDINAVIAN STATES. THEIR RECENT ACTIONS IN THAT AREA OF THEIR FOREIGN POLICY SEEM TO US TO BE MOSTLY CREATIVE REACTION TO DEVELOPMENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED APART FROM ANY SOVIET CONTROL. WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO USE EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO EXPAND THEIR INFLUENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE. BUT IS IS OUR OPINION THAT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY REASON THAT ANY HARSH NEW INITIATIVES AT THE PRESENT TIME IN THAT PART OF THE WORLD COULD UPSET THEIR APPLE CART IN OTHER PARTS OF WESTERN EUROPE  
END SUMMARY.

2. THERE HAS BEEN A GOOD DEAL OF SPECULATION IN THE WESTERN PRESS ABOUT POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET LINE ON RELATIONS WITH THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES. MOST OF THIS STEMS FROM THE ARTICLE IN THE FINNISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC NEWSPAPER DEMARI IN FEBRUARY WHICH FLOATED THE IDEA OF "COOPERATION" BETWEEN THE NORDIC COUNCIL AND THE SOVIET UNION (REF A). INCREASED SOVIET PRESS SNIPING AT SCANDINAVIAN TARGETS HAS ALSO HEIGHTENED INTEREST IN THE SOVIET DESIGNS ON THAT PART OF EUROPE. THIS SNIPING HAS TAKEN SUCH FORMS AS A RECENT ARTICLE  
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ATTACKING SWEDISH PARTICIPATION IN INITIAL BIDDING ON THE REPLACEMENT FIGHTER DEAL FOR SEVERAL EUROPEAN NATO COUNTRIES (PRAVDA, FEBRUARY 14). THE ARTICLE, CITING SWEDISH PRESS SOURCES, CALLED INTO QUESTION SWEDEN'S CONTINUED NEUTRALITY. THE SOVIET ARMY NEWSPAPER HAS REACTED SHARPLY TO REMARKS BY A NORWEGIAN GENERAL ON A SOVIET THREAT IN THE KOLA PENINSULA (RED STAR, FEBRUARY 27). AND POINTED SOVIET COMMENTARY APPEARED

IN PRAVDA ON MARCH 11 ON PLANS BY NORWAY, THE FRG, THE UK, DENMARK AND THE NETHERLANDS TO ESTABLISH A DEFENSE FORCE FOR NORWEGIAN OFFSHORE OIL FIELDS.

3. THESE ARTICLES ON SCANDINAVIA HAVE PROMPTED OUR DIPLOMATIC COLLEAGUES IN MOSCOW TO DO A BIT OF SPECULATING THEMSELVES. THE FRENCH, BRITISH, AND LUXEMBOURG AMBASSADORS ARE ALL OF THE OPINION THAT THE SOVIETS ARE IN FACT IN THE PROCESS OF "BEGINNING SOMETHING". THE UK AMBASSADOR (GARVEY) SAID THAT HE BELIEVES THAT THE SOVIET INITIATIVE VIS-A-VIS THE NORDIC COUNCIL AND THE RESURRECTED NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IDEA ARE REFLECTIONS OF A NEW SOVIET INITIATIVE DESIGNED TO REDUCE NATO AND EC INFLUENCE IN SCANDINAVIA. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR (VIMONT) HAS ALSO POINTED TO THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE NORWEGIANS AND THE SOVIETS ON THE SVALBARD CONTINENTAL SHELF AS ANOTHER INDICATION THAT THE AREA HAS BECOME "SENSITIZED".

4. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT SEE THE SOVIETS TAKING ANY GRAND INITIATIVES IN SCANDINAVIA AT THE PRESENT TIME. THEY OBVIOUSLY ARE GOING TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE. BUT THEIR RECENT ACTIVITIES IN THAT AREA SEEM TO US TO BE MORE INDICATIVE OF REACTION--ALBEIT PERHAPS CREATIVE REACTION--THAN INITIATIVE. OUR REASONING IS AS FOLLOWS.

5. THE NORDIC COUNCIL. IT SEEMS FROM AMBASSADOR CROWE'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DANISH FOREIGN MINISTER IN COPENHAGEN (REF B), AS WELL AS FROM EMBASSY HELSINKI'S CONVERSATIONS WITH THE FINNISH SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (REF C), THAT THE SOVIETS PROBABLY DID NOT OPENLY INITIATE THE IDEA OF COOPERATION WITH THE NORDIC COUNCIL, AT LEAST AS CONFIDENTIAL

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THAT IDEA WAS EXPRESSED IN THE DEMARI ARTICLE. OF COURSE, ONCE THE IDEA WAS FLOATED THEY WELCOMED IT WITH OPEN ARMS. A SIGNED COMMENTARY IN IZVESTIYA (YU. GOLOSHUBOV), ON FEBRUARY 28 CONTENDED THAT THE IDEA OF SOVIET COOPERATION WITH SCANDINAVIA IS A POSITIVE ONE IN AND OF ITSELF; THAT SUCH COOPERATION IS ALREADY A FACT OF LIFE IN MANY AREAS OF ENDEAVOR; AND THAT THOSE WHO OPPOSE SUCH COOPERATION ARE WORKING AT CROSS PURPOSES WITH THE NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLES OF SCANDINAVIA. WE NOTE ALSO THAT THE COMMUNIQUE PUBLISHED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE FEBRUARY 26-28 VISIT TO MOSCOW BY A FINNISH COMMUNIST PARTY DELEGATION (PRAVDA, MARCH 2) STATES THAT AN EXCHANGE OF OPINIONS TOOK PLACE ON THE SUBJECT OF -NEW CONCRETE FORMS" OF COOPERATION "BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND FINLAND." WE PRESUME THIS WAS A REFERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT ANNOUNCED IN THE COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF THE JUST-CON-

CLUDED KEKKONEN VISIT (PRAVDA, MARCH 15) CALLING FOR A  
15-YEAR PLAN ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET-FINNISH ECONOMIC  
RELATIONS. THIS OF COURSE IS A FURTHER STEP IN A LONG  
LINE OF SUCH STEPS AIMED AT BRINGING FINLAND INTO LINE WITH  
THE COMECON PLANNING APPARATUS. THE SOVIETS THUS ARE CONTINUING  
THEIR EFFORTS TO TIE THE FINNISH ECONOMY TO THEIR OWN; WE  
SEE NO READY EVIDENCE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY ARE EMBARKING ON  
ANY EFFORT TO SPREAD THEIR ECONOMIC INFLUENCE INTO THE REST  
OF SCANDINAVIA.

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02 INR-07

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OMB-01 CEA-01 FEA-01 OES-03 COME-00 ACDA-05 INT-05

ERDA-05 /104 W

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R 151207Z MAR 75  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8181  
INFO AMEMBASSY BERLIN  
USMISSION USBERLIN  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN  
USMISSION GENEVA  
AMEMBASSY HELSINKI  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
USMISSION NATO  
AMEMBASSY OSLO  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK  
AMEMBASSY ROME  
AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
CINCEUR  
CINCLANT

CINCPAC  
CINCUSAREUR  
CINCUSNAVEUR  
USNMR SHAPE

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GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE  
SHAPE FOR POLAD

6. SWEDISH NEUTRALITY. SWEDISH PARTICIPATION IN BIDDING FOR FIGHTER SALES TO NATO WAS BOUND TO HAVE CALLED FORTH SOME SOVIET REACTION. THE KREMLIN CHOSE TO EXPRESS ITS MISGIVINGS IN THE FIRMLY WORDED ARTICLE NOTED ABOVE, REPLAYING SWEDISH PRESS COMMENTARY QUESTIONING WHETHER SUPPLY OF SUCH WEAPONS (AND ESPECIALLY WHETHER SUPPLY OF SPARE PARTS DURING TIME OF WAR) WAS IN KEEPING WITH SWEDISH PROTESTATIONS OF NEUTRALITY. WE DO NOT ASCRIBE TO THIS SINGLE ARTICLE ANY LASTING SIGNIFICANCE AND WOULD NOTE THAT NO FURTHER "CAMPAIGN" OF ANY KIND HAS DEVELOPED.

7. NORWEGIAN OIL. SIMILARLY, EFFORTS BY NATO AND/OR THE EUROGROUP TO ESTABLISH A DEFENSE FORCE WHICH WOULD SERVE, IN SOVIET EYES, FURTHER TO CONTROL THEIR EGRESS OUT OF THE BARENTS AND NORWEGIAN SEAS INTO THE ATLANTIC WERE NOT FATED TO BE LOOKED UPON KINDLY IN MOSCOW. SOMETHING OF A MINI-CAMPAIGN HAS INDEED BEEN MOUNTED BY THE SOVIETS ON THIS ISSUE, RANGING FROM SOVIET APPROACHES TO THE NORWEGIANS (REF D) TO CONTINUING PRESS COMMENTARY, THE LATEST OF WHICH IS THE PRAVDA PIECE ON MARCH 11. HOWEVER, THIS IS NOT SURPRISING.

8. THE NUCLEAR FREE ZONE. PODGORNYY'S OFFER OF A GUARANTEE FOR THE KEKKONEN PLAN DURING HIS VISIT TO HELSINKI IN OCTOBER APPARENTLY WAS A SOVIET INITIATIVE (SEE REF E). WHY PODGORNYY OFFERED SUCH A GUARANTEE PUZZLED EVEN THE FINNS, ACCORDING TO REF E WHO PREFERRED NOT TO MENTION THE OFFER IN THE COMMUNIQUE AT THE END OF THE VISIT. THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MAY HAVE THOUGHT THAT IN MAKING THE OFFER THEY WOULD BE SUPPORTING A FAVORITE PRIVATE INITIATIVE OF KEKKONEN'S, AND WOULD THEREBY GAIN POLITICAL CREDIT TO BE UTILIZED AT A LATER DATE. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD LITTLE TO SAY ON THE ISSUE SINCE THAT TIME, PERHAPS REALIZING

THAT NORWAY AND SWEDEN REGARD THE PLAN WITH CONSIDERABLE  
SUSPICION (REF E AGAIN, INTER ALIA), AND THAT PUSHING  
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THE IDEA WILL SERVE ONLY TO EXACERBATE RELATIONS WITH  
THOSE STATES. INTERESTINGLY, THE BRITISH TOLD US THAT  
DURING NEGOTIATIONS ON THE JOINT UK-SOVIET DECLARATION ON  
NPT ISSUED DURING THE WILSON VISIT HERE IN FEBRUARY, ALL  
MENTION OF NUCLEAR FREE ZONES WAS REMOVED FROM THE DECLARATION  
AT THE REQUEST OF THE SOVIETS. AND WE NOTE THAT NO MENTION  
OF A NUCLEAR FREE ZONE IS MADE IN THE COMMUNIQUE FROM KEKKONEN'S  
JUST ENDED VISIT. IT WOULD THUS SEEM THAT THE "KEKKONEN  
PLAN" HAS BEEN SHELVED FOR THE TIME BEING.

9. IN SUM, THE SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE USE OF EVERY  
OPPORTUNITY TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE IN SCANDINAVIA, AS  
THEY OF COURSE ALWAYS HAVE. AND THERE ARE CHANGES IN THE  
OBJECTIVE SITUATION IN SCANDINAVIA -- SUCH AS THE NORWEGIAN  
OIL FIELDS -- WHICH WILL EVENTUALLY CAUSE THEM TO REEXAMINE  
AND MODIFY THEIR VIEWS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT IF OIL-RICH NORWAY  
SHOULD ATTEMPT TO REDUCE FINNISH DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET  
UNION THROUGH AN OFFER OF FAVORABLE OIL PRICES? BUT WE DO  
NOT SEE THEM TAKING ANY SIGNIFICANT NEW INITIATIVES IN THE AREA  
AT THE PRESENT TIME. THEIR GENERAL LINE VIS-A-VIS THE OTHER  
PARTS OF WESTERN EUROPE AT PRESENT SEEMS TO BE PREDICATED ON  
THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE RELAXATION OF POLITICAL TENSIONS, THE  
INCREASED INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTABILITY AND PRESTIGE OF THE  
SOVIET UNION NOW BEING CONFIRMED IN SUCH FORA AS CSCE, AND  
THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES THE WEST IS NOW EXPERIENCING WILL,  
TAKEN TOGETHER, BY THEMSELVES WORK TO INCREASE SOVIET INFLUENCE  
IN EUROPE. OVERT POLITICAL PRESSURE RUNS THE DANGER OF  
CREATING AN UNFAVORABLE REACTION TO THE "OBJECTIVE EVOLUTION"  
OF THE SITUATION IN WESTERN EUROPE TO THEIR ADVANTAGE.  
WE PRESUME THAT THEY WILL FOLLOW THIS SAME LINE OF THINKING  
IN SCANDINAVIA. HARSH NEW INITIATIVES IN THAT PART OF THE  
WORLD AT THE PRESENT TIME COULD RESULT IN UNFAVORABLE DEVELOP-  
MENTS NOT ONLY IN SCANDINAVIA, BUT IN THE REST OF EUROPE AS  
WELL.  
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## Message Attributes

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**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
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